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1404 Virtue 
VIRTUE 
In political theory, the word virtue usually refers 
to the disposition or character traits appropriate to 
a citizen. Someone who takes the responsibilities 
of citizenship seriously, to the point of putting the 
common good ahead of his or her personal inter-
ests, is thus said to display civic virtue. Political 
theorists have frequently warned that such virtue 
cannot be taken for granted, however, and many 
of them have urged that steps be taken to promote 
or foster civic virtue. This concern for the fragility 
of civic virtue is a clear theme in ancient (or classi-
cal) political thought, but it has also played an 
important part in modern and contemporary 
political theory. 
The Concept of Virtue 
The English word virtue derives from the Latin 
virtus, but scholars typically trace the concept of 
virtue to the Greek idea of arete, which may be 
translated as either "virtue" or "excellence." To 
ancient thinkers, virtue was not so much a matter 
of holding and following the right beliefs as it was 
a matter of outstanding ability-that is, of excel-
lence. A great warrior, such as Achilles in Homer's 
Iliad, would exhibit the virtues of courage and 
strength; a great philosopher, such as Socrates, 
would exemplify the virtues of wisdom and justice. 
But virtue was not something confined to human 
beings. Anything that was excellent in the appro-
priate way, including animals and tools, would be 
virtuous. Traces of this way of thinking are still 
with us, as when someone speaks of the virtue of a 
watch being its accurate time keeping, or of a knife 
that has the virtue of cutting cleanly. Such usages, 
though, are likely to seem quaint, and perhaps 
even archaic, in a time when virtue is usually 
regarded as moral goodness. 
Ancient philosophers and poets concerned them-
selves more with the virtues of people than with 
those of animals and implements, of course, and in 
this regard it is important to note the connection 
between the Latin words virtus and vir, or man. 
Women could be excellent in their own way, but 
for the Romans virtue largely consisted in the kinds 
of excellence expected of men. In Virgil's Aeneid, 
for example, the hero Aeneas is a leader of men, a 
mighty warrior, and a model of piety who shows 
proper reverence for both his father and the 
gods-a paragon of all that a man should be. 
Aeneas also put his love of country and devotion to 
duty above his own happiness and pleasure, and in 
doing so he served as an exemplar of civic virtue. 
This connection between virtue and manliness 
persisted into modern history, as the next section 
will indicate, but the rise of Christianity presented 
a powerful challenge. For ancient philosophers, the 
cardinal virtues were courage, wisdom, temperance 
(or prudence), and justice. These are not exclu-
sively military or "manly" excellences, to be sure, 
but it was easy to think of them as being more 
appropriate to men than to women, who were 
largely confined to domestic life. To these classical 
virtues, however, Christians added the "theological 
virtues" of faith, hope, and love (agape in Greek, 
caritas in Latin)-virtues that are neither martial 
nor particularly manly, in the classical view. 
The growing emphasis on the theological or 
Christian virtues in late antiquity may also have 
contributed to the tendency to think of virtue as a 
matter of moral goodness rather than excellence or 
outstanding ability. This tendency is reflected in 
the distinction that we have come to draw, at least 
implicitly, between a virtuoso and a virtuous per-
son. A virtuoso is someone who possesses and 
displays outstanding ability of some sort-usually 
outstanding musical ab~lity-but there is no reason 
to think that a virtuoso will also be a virtuous, or 
morally admirable, person. In this respect, the 
modern conception of virtue is quite different from 
the ancient. 
Civic Virtue in Ancient Political Thought 
For the classical political philosophers of the 
ancient world, civic or political virtue was largely a 
matter of putting aside private desires and personal 
interests in order to do what is best for the public 
at large. In his Republic, for example, the Greek 
philosopher Plato (427-347 BCE) argues that rul-
ing, or statesmanship, is a craft that aims at what 
is best not for the ruler, but for those who are 
ruled. Plato's student Aristotle (384-322 BCE) 
went on to say, in his Politics, that the citizen is 
someone who both rules and is ruled-that is, 
someone who has a say in determining what poli-
cies and laws should be enacted, but who also has 
a responsibility to obey those policies and laws. For 
Aristotle, the conditions that foster a virtuous life, 
including the life of the virtuous citizen, are those 
of the middle class, for the people in this class are 
neither so rich as to be spoiled by a life of luxury 
nor so poor as to be ground down by poverty. 
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Those in the middle class are prosperous enough to 
be able to devote some time to politics, and to 
think and speak independently when they do, but 
not so wealthy as to lose respect for the value of 
work and thrift. The most fortunate political soci-
ety, then, is the one in which people of middling 
means dominate, for there civic virtue is most likely 
to thrive. For Plato and Aristotle, moreover, educa-
tion is of fundamental concern, for the proper 
education will cultivate the proper dispositions and 
traits among those young people who are to 
become citizens. 
Similar attitudes prevailed among Roman polit-
ical thinkers, especially Cicero (106-43 BCE) and 
other champions of the republic. As its derivation 
from the Latin res publica indicates, the republic 
is the "public thing," or the public business of all 
citizens. The good citizen, therefore, will be the 
one who distinguishes himself-and citizens were 
exclusively men-by his devotion to the good of 
the republic. Civic virtue, in other words, was 
republican virtue, and the most virtuous were 
those who would bear arms or otherwise risk life 
and fortune to preserve the republic. One cele-
brated model of the republican citizen was the 
general Cincinnatus, who left his farm to lead the 
Roman army in the fifth century BCE, only to 
relinquish his command and return to farming 
once victory had secured the survival of the 
republic. 
Civic Virtue in Modern Political Thought 
Virtue has remained an important concern of mod-
ern political theorists, and nowhere more plainly 
so than in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli 
(1469-1527), a citizen of Florence. Machiavelli 
wrote in Italian rather than Latin, but his frequent 
references to virtii indicate that virtue remained for 
him very much a manly and martial quality. In his 
most famous book, The Prince, he finds virtue not 
only in those who are bold and brave, but also in 
those who are deceitful and cruel, at least when 
deceit and cruelty will help to preserve the state. In 
his Discourses on Livy and other writings, more-
over, Machiavelli praises republican virtue and 
advocates a militia composed of arms-bearing citi-
zens, which he took to be a better safeguard of the 
citizens' liberty than reliance on mercenaries or a 
standing army of professional soldiers. 
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Like other republicans, Machiavelli tended to 
think of corruption as the enemy of civic virtue. If 
civic virtue is the disposition to put the public good 
ahead of one's own, then corruption is what ensues 
when people think first and foremost of their pri-
vate or personal interests. In order to promote and 
sustain civic virtue, then, it is necessary to be on 
guard against ambition, avarice, and luxury-that 
is, against the love of power, of money, and of the 
soft, easy life. Establishing a citizen militia would 
be one way to cultivate devotion to the common 
good while combating corruption. 
This opposition of virtue to corruption contin-
ued to play an important part in modern political 
theory, but less obviously so as virtue came to be 
associated as much with commerce-in the form 
of such bourgeois virtues as thrift, industry, and 
far-sightedness-as it was with citizenship or piety. 
This desire to promote both commercial and civic 
virtues appears, for example, in the works of the 
French philosopher the baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) and some of the founding fathers of 
the United States. 
Montesquieu placed so much emphasis on vir-
tue as love of one's country and "love of equal-
ity" in his The Spirit of the Laws that he found 
it necessary, in a foreword to the second edi-
tion, to assure church authorities that his con-
cern was with "political" rather than "moral" or 
"Christian" virtue. For Montesquieu, political or 
civic virtue is the "principle"-that is, the main-
spring or motivating force-of republican govern-
ments. What moves people to act in a monarchy, 
he said, is the love of honor; in a despotic regime, 
it is fear; and in a republic, it is virtue, understood 
as love of a country where the citizens are equal 
under the law. The problem is how to preserve 
this political virtue in an increasingly commercial, 
profit-driven world. 
One answer to this question is to design politi-
cal institutions in such a way as to make reliance 
on virtuous citizens less necessary, if not altogether 
unnecessary. Montesquieu thought that the British 
had hit on one way of doing this by the separation 
of powers in their government, with executive 
power vested in the crown, legislative power in the 
parliament, and judicial power in the courts. By 
separating power in this way, self-interested or 
ambitious attempts to advance private interests 
would be frustrated by their inability to gain control 
of all the branches of government. To this device 
other political thinkers added the checks and bal-
ances that enable those who control one branch of 
government to thwart the designs of those in the 
other branches. 
Separation of powers and checks and balances 
are key features of the U.S. Constitution, and there 
is no doubt that the framers of the Constitution 
intended these devices as safeguards against ambi-
tion, avarice, and other vices. As James Madison 
wrote in The Federalist, number 51, the need for 
government is itself a reflection on human nature; 
and just as government must control the governed, 
so must it also control itself. That is why "[a]mbi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition" in a 
system of checks and balances. Yet Madison also 
held, in The Federalist, number 57, that every con-
stitution ought to aim first at placing power in the 
hands of those who possess "most virtue to pur-
sue, the common good of society," and then aim at 
"keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to 
hold their public trust." Like the ancient philoso-
phers, Madison and other early modern thinkers 
remained convinced of both the importance and 
the fragility of civic virtue. 
A similar concern seems to have led Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1804-1859) towarninhisDemocracy 
in America against the threat of "individualism," 
which he took to be a withdrawal from public life 
in favor of life in the narrow circle of family and 
friends. Part of the remedy, Tocqueville said, is to 
educate people to see that self-interest properly 
understood requires them to bear a share of 
the responsibility for democratic government. 
His English contemporary, John Stuart Mill 
(1806-1873), went on to argue against the secret 
ballot on the grounds that voting is not a right but 
a public trust-a trust that is best fulfilled by cast-
ing one's vote openly. Mill seldom spoke explicitly 
of civic virtue, however, and in that regard he 
seems typical of political theorists throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. 
The reasons for this neglect are no doubt mani-
fold and complicated. According to some scholars, 
the emphasis that social-contract theorists and oth-
ers gave to natural rights and individual liberties 
drew attention away from civic duty and virtue-
and perhaps fostered the kind of individualism 
that Tocqueville deplored. Virtue may also have 
seemed unimportant to thinkers who believed that 
a proper grasp of human nature or history would 
provide the key to the proper arrangement of 
political society. For the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832), for example, the knowledge that 
desire for pleasure and aversion to pain govern our 
actions leads quickly to the conclusion that the 
business of government is to promote social happi-
ness by punishing those who cause pain and 
rewarding those who give pleasure. This was a 
step, moreover, that required no attention to civic 
virtue. For Karl Marx (1818-1883) and many 
other socialists, virtue and other moralistic terms 
were ideological vestiges that would be left behind 
once class conflict and technological growth had 
brought about a new historical epoch in which 
every individual will be equally free to develop his 
or her potential. To the extent that it still carried 
aristocratic connotations as a celebration of excel-
lence, virtue may also have seemed hostile to the 
egalitarian ethos that motivated not only socialists 
but all advocates of democracy. 
Civic Virtue Today 
Whatever the reasons for its neglect in the nine-
teenth century, political theorists' interest in civic 
virtue clearly began to revive late in the twentieth 
century. This revival is likely related to the renewed 
interest in "virtue theory," with its long look back-
ward to Aristotle, on the part of moral philoso-
phers. Another contributing factor is the growing 
sense that liberal democracy requires some signifi-
cant degree of virtue among its citizens if it is to 
survive. As societies have become more populous, 
the state or government seems to be more remote 
from the citizen; and as societies have become 
more diverse ethnically and culturally, the bonds 
that draw citizens together seem to be weaker than 
in decades past. In conditions such as these, a vir-
tuous citizenry cannot be taken for granted; nor is 
it clear that institutional arrangements and incen-
tives can sustain liberal democracy in the absence 
of civic virtue. As a consequence, many political 
theorists are once again asking how this fragile 
virtue can be fostered and protected. One result is 
a renewed interest in civic education; another is 
increased attention to the question of what it 
means to be a citizen in a multicultural society and 
an increasingly cosmopolitan world. Y ct another is 
the question of whether the concept of civic virtue 
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is irretrievably tied to the idea of the arms-bearing 
male citizen, or whether it is capacious enough to 
accommodate women. 
How these questions are or ought to be answered 
is the subject of lively debate in the early twenty-
first century. The fact that the debate goes on, 
however, and that it is so lively, testifies to the con-
tinuing importance of virtue to political theory. 
Richard Dagger 
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